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Abstract
We relate here two formalisms that are used for
different purposes in reasoning about multi-agent sys-
tems. One of them are strategic games that are used
to capture the idea that agents interact with each other
while pursuing their own interest. The other are CP-
nets that were introduced to express qualitative and
conditional preferences of the users and which aim at
facilitating the process of preference elicitation.
To relate these two formalisms we introduce a nat-
ural, qualitative, extension of the notion of a strate-
gic game. We show then that the optimal outcomes
of a CP-net are exactly the Nash equilibria of an ap-
propriately defined strategic game in the above sense.
This allows us to use the techniques of game theory to
search for optimal outcomes of CP-nets and vice-versa,
to use techniques developed for CP-nets to search for
Nash equilibria of the considered games.
1 Introduction
One of the main tools in the area of multi-agent sys-
tems is game theory, notably strategic games. They
formalize in a simple and powerful way the idea that
agents interact with each other while pursuing their
own interest. The interaction is captured by the
fact that actions (strategies) are taken simultaneously,
while agents’ interests are expressed by means of the
utility (payoff) function that each agent wishes to
maximize.
CP-nets (Conditional Preference nets) are an ele-
gant formalism for representing conditional and qual-
itative preferences, see [3, 2]. They model such pref-
erences under a ceteris paribus (that is, ‘all else being
equal’) assumption. The CP-net represents a complex
‘joint preference distribution’ in a compact form. Pref-
erence elicitation in such a framework appears to be
natural and intuitive.
Research on CP-nets focused on its modeling ca-
pabilities and algorithms for solving various natural
problems related to their use. Also, computational
complexity of these problems was extensively studied.
An outcome of a CP-net is an assignment of values to
its variables. One of the fundamental problems is that
of finding an optimal outcome, i.e., the one that can-
not be improved in presence of the adopted preference
statements. This is in general a complex problem since
it was found that finding optimal outcomes and testing
for their existence is NP-hard in general. In contrast,
for so-called acyclic CP-nets this is an easy problem
which can be solved by a linear time algorithm.
The aim of this paper to show the relationship
between CP-nets and game theory, and explain how
game-theoretic techniques developed for the analysis
of strategic games can be fruitfully used to study CP-
nets. To this end, we introduce a generalization of
the customary strategic games (see, e.g., [5],) in which
each player has to his disposal a strict preference re-
lation on his set of strategies, parametrized by a joint
strategy of his opponents. We call such games strategic
games with parametrized preferences.
The cornerstone of our approach are two results
closely relating CP-nets to such games. They show
that the optimal outcomes of a CP-net are exactly the
Nash equilibria of an appropriately defined strategic
game with parametrized preferences. This allows us
to transfer techniques of game theory to CP-nets.
To find Nash equilibria in strategic games, reduc-
tion techniques have been studied which reduce the
game by eliminating some players’ strategies, thus ob-
taining a smaller game. We introduce two counter-
parts of such game-theoretic techniques that allow us
to reduce a CP-net while maintaining its optimal out-
comes. We also introduce a method of simplifying a
CP-net by eliminating so-called redundant variables
from the variables parent sets. Both techniques sim-
plify the search for optimal outcomes of a CP-net.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 pro-
vides the basic definitions of CP-nets. Then, Section
3 introduces our generalized notion of games, Section
4 shows how to pass from a CP-net to a game, and
Section 5 handles the opposite direction. Then, Sec-
tion 6 introduces the concept of reduced CP-nets, and
Section 7 shows how to exploit techniques developed in
games for CP-nets. Finally, Section 8 summarizes the
main contributions of the paper and discusses current
and future work.
2 CP-nets
CP-nets [3, 2] (for Conditional Preference nets) are
a graphical model for compactly representing condi-
tional and qualitative preference relations. They ex-
ploit conditional preferential independence by decom-
posing an agent’s preferences via the ceteris paribus
(cp) assumption. Informally, CP-nets are sets of ce-
teris paribus (cp) preference statements. For in-
stance, the statement “I prefer red wine to white wine
if meat is served.” asserts that, given two meals that
differ only in the kind of wine served and both con-
taining meat, the meal with a red wine is preferable
to the meal with a white wine. On the other hand,
this statement does not order two meals with a differ-
ent main course. Many users’ preferences appear to
be of this type.
CP-nets bear some similarity to Bayesian networks.
Both utilize directed graphs where each node stands
for a domain variable, and assume a set of features
(variables) F = {X1, . . . , Xn} with the corresponding
finite domains D(X1), . . . ,D(Xn). For each featureXi,
a user specifies a (possibly empty) set of parent fea-
tures Pa(Xi) that can affect her preferences over the
values of Xi. This defines a dependency graph in
which each node Xi has Pa(Xi) as its immediate pre-
decessors.
Given this structural information, the user explic-
itly specifies her preference over the values of Xi for
each complete assignment on Pa(Xi). This preference
is assumed to take the form of a linear ordering over
D(Xi) [3, 2]. Each such specification is called below
a preference statement for the variable Xi. These
conditional preferences over the values of Xi are cap-
tured by a conditional preference table which is anno-
tated with the node Xi in the CP-net. An outcome
is an assignment of values to the variables with each
value taken from the corresponding domain.
As an example, consider a CP-net whose features
are A, B, C and D, with binary domains containing
f and f if F is the name of the feature, and with the
following preference statements:
d : a ≻ a, d : a ≻ a,
a : b ≻ b, a : b ≻ b,
b : c ≻ c, b : c ≻ c,
c : d ≻ d, c : d ≻ d.
Here the preference statement d : a ≻ a states that
A = a is preferred to A = a, given that D = d.
From the structure of these preference statements
we see that Pa(A) = {D}, Pa(B) = {A}, Pa(C) =
{B}, Pa(D) = {C} so the dependency graph is cyclic.
An acyclic CP-net is one in which the dependency
graph is acyclic. As an example, consider a CP-net
whose features and domains are as above and with
the following preference statements:
a ≻ a,
b ≻ b,
(a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ b) : c ≻ c, (a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ b) : c ≻ c,
c : d ≻ d, c : d ≻ d.
Here, the preference statement a ≻ a represents the
unconditional preference for A = a over A = a. Also
each preference statement for the variable C is a ac-
tually an abbreviated version of two preference state-
ments. In this example we have Pa(A) = ∅, Pa(B) =
∅, Pa(C) = {A,B}, Pa(D) = {C}.
The semantics of CP-nets depends on the notion of
a worsening flip . A worsening flip is a transition
between two outcomes that consists of a change in the
value of a single variable to one which is less preferred
in the unique preference statement for that variable.
By analogy we define an improving flip . For exam-
ple, in the acyclic CP-net above, passing from abcd to
abcd is a worsening flip since c is better than c given
a and b. We say that an outcome α is better than
the outcome β (or, equivalently, β is worse than α),
written as α ≻ β, iff there is a chain of worsening flips
from α to β. This definition induces a strict preorder
over the outcomes. In the above acyclic CP-net the
outcome abcd is worse than abcd.
An optimal outcome is one for which no better
outcome exists. In general, a CP-net does not need to
have an optimal outcome. As an example consider two
features A and B with the respective domains {a, a}
and {b, b} and the following preference statements:
a : b ≻ b, a : b ≻ b,
b : a ≻ a, b : a ≻ a.
It is easy to see that then
ab ≻ ab ≻ ab ≻ ab ≻ ab.
3 Strategic games with parametrized
preferences
In this section we introduce a generalization of the
notion of a strategic game used in game theory, see,
e.g., [5].
First we need the concept of a preference on a set
A which in this paper denotes a strict linear ordering
on A. If ≻ is a preference, we denote by  the corre-
sponding weak preference defined by: a  b iff a ≻ b
or a = b.
Given a sequence of non-empty sets S1, . . ., Sn and
s ∈ S1 × . . .× Sn we denote the ith element of s by si
and use the following standard notation of game the-
ory, where I := i1, . . ., ik is a subsequence of 1, . . ., n:
• s−i := (s1, . . ., si−1, si+1, . . ., sn),
• sI := (si1 , . . ., sik),
• (s′i, s−i) := (s1, . . ., si−1, s
′
i, si+1, . . ., sn), where
we assume that s′
i
∈ Si,
• S−i := S1 × . . .× Si−1 × Si+1 × . . .× Sn,
• SI := Si1 × . . .× Sik .
In game theory it is customary to study strategic
games in which the outcomes are numerical values pro-
vided by means of the payoff functions. A notable ex-
ception is [6] in which instead of payoff functions the
linear quasi-orderings on the sets of joint strategies are
used.
In our setup we adopt a different approach accord-
ing to which each player has to his disposal a strict
preference relation ≻ (s−i) on his set of strategies
parametrized by a joint strategy s−i of his opponents.
So in our approach
• for each i ∈ [1..n] player i has a finite, non-empty,
set Si of strategies available to him,
• for each i ∈ [1..n] and s−i ∈ S−i player i has a
preference relation ≻(s−i) on his set of strategies
Si.
In what follows such a strategic game with
parametrized preferences (in short a game with
parametrized preferences, or just a game) for n
players is represented by a sequence
(S1, . . ., Sn,≻(s−1), . . .,≻(s−n)),
where each s−i ranges over S−i.
It is straightforward to transfer to the case of games
with parametrized preferences the basic notions con-
cerning strategic games. In particular, given a game
G with parametrized preferences specified as above we
say that a joint strategy s is a (pure) Nash equilib-
rium of G if for all i ∈ [1..n] and all s′
i
∈ Si
si (s−i) s
′
i.
(For the original definition see, e.g., [5].)
To clarify this definitions consider the classical Pris-
oner’s dilemma strategic game represented by the fol-
lowing bimatrix representing the payoffs to both play-
ers:
C2 N2
C1 3, 3 0, 4
N1 4, 0 1, 1
So each player i has two strategies, Ci (cooperate) and
Ni (not cooperate), the payoff to player 1 for the joint
strategy (C1, N2) is 0, etc. To represent this game
as a game with parametrized preferences we simply
stipulate that
≻(C2) := N1 ≻ C1, ≻(N2) := N1 ≻ C1,
≻(C1) := N2 ≻ C2, ≻(N1) := N2 ≻ C2.
These orderings reflect the fact that for each strategy
of the opponent each player considers his ‘not cooper-
ate’ strategy better than his ‘cooperate’ strategy. It is
easy to check that (N1, N2) is a unique Nash equilib-
rium of this game with parametrized preferences.
4 From CP-nets to strategic games
Consider now a CP-net with the set of variables
{X1, . . ., Xn} with the corresponding finite domains
D(X1), . . .,D(Xn). We write each preference state-
ment for the variable Xi as XI = aI : ≻i, where for
the subsequence I = i1, . . ., ik of 1, . . ., n:
• Pa(Xi) = {Xi1 , . . ., Xik},
• XI = aI is an abbreviation for Xi1 =
ai1 ∧ . . . ∧ Xik = aik ,
• ≻i is a preference over D(Xi).
We also abbreviate D(Xi1 )× . . .×D(Xik) to D(XI).
By definition, the preference statements for a vari-
able Xi are exactly all statements of the form XI =
aI : ≻(aI), where aI ranges over D(XI) and ≻(aI) is
a preference on D(Xi) that depends on aI .
We now associate with each CP-netN a game G(N)
with parametrized preferences as follows:
• each variable Xi corresponds to a player i,
• the strategies of player i are the elements of the
domain D(Xi) of Xi.
To define the parametrized preferences, consider a
player i. Suppose Pa(Xi) = {Xi1 , . . ., Xik} and let
I := i1, . . ., ik. So I is a subsequence of 1, . . ., i− 1, i+
1, . . ., n. Given a joint strategy a−i of the opponents
of player i, we associate with it the preference relation
≻(aI) on D(Xi) where XI = aI : ≻(aI) is the unique
preference statement for Xi determined by aI .
In words, the preference of a player i over his strate-
gies, given the strategies chosen by its opponents, say
a−i, coincides with the preference given by the CP-
net over the domain of Xi given the assignment to his
parents aI which must coincide with the projection of
a−i over I. This completes the definition of G(N).
As an example consider the first CP-net of Section
2. The corresponding game has four players A, B,
C, D, each with two strategies indicated with f , f¯
for player F . The preference of each player on his
strategies will depend only on the strategies chosen by
the players which correspond to his parents in the CP-
net. Consider for example player B. His preference
over his strategies b and b¯, given the joint strategy of
his opponents s−B = dac, is b ≻ b¯. Notice that, for
example, the same ordering holds for the opponents
joint strategy s−B = d¯ac¯, since the strategy chosen
by the only player corresponding to his parent, A, has
not changed.
We have then the following result.
Theorem 1 An outcome of a CP-net N is optimal iff
it is a Nash equilibrium of the game G(N).
5 From strategic games to CP-nets
We now associate with each game G with
parametrized preferences a CP-net N (G) as follows:
• each player i corresponds to a variable Xi,
• the domain D(Xi) of the variable Xi consists of
the set of strategies of player i,
• we stipulate that Pa(Xi) =
{X1, Xi−1, . . ., Xi+1, . . ., Xn}, where n is the
number of players in G.
Next, for each joint strategy s−i of the opponents
of player i we take the preference statement X−i =
s−i : ≻(s−i), where ≻(s−i) is the preference relation
on the set of strategies of player i associated with s−i.
This completes the definition of N (G). As an ex-
ample of this construction let us return to the Pris-
oner’s dilemma game with parametrized preferences
from Section 3. In the corresponding CP-net we have
then two variables X1 and X2 corresponding to play-
ers 1 and 2, with the respective domains {C1, N1}
and {C2, N2}. To explain how each parametrized
preference translates to a preference statement take
for example ≻(C2) := N1 ≻ C1. It translates to
X2 = C2 : N1 ≻ C1.
We have now the following counterpart of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 A joint strategy is a Nash equilibrium of
the game G iff it is an optimal outcome of the CP-net
N (G).
6 Reduced CP-nets
The disadvantage of the above construction of the
CP-netN (G) from a gameG is that it always produces
a CP-net in which all sets of parent features are of size
n− 1 where n is the number of features of the CP-net.
This can be rectified by reducing each set of parent
features to a minimal one as follows.
Given a CP-net N , consider a variable Xi with the
parents Pa(Xi), and take a variable Y ∈ Pa(Xi). Sup-
pose that for all assignments a to Pa(X) − {Y } and
any two values y1, y2 ∈ D(Y ), the orderings ≻(a, y1)
and ≻(a, y2) on D(Xi) coincide.
We say then that Y is redundant in the set of par-
ents of Xi. It is easy to see that by removing all re-
dundant variables from the set of parents of Xi and
by modifying the corresponding preference statements
for Xi accordingly, the strict preorder ≻ over the out-
comes of the CP-nets is not changed.
Given a CP-net, if for all its variable Xi the set
Pa(Xi) does not contain any redundant variable, we
say that the CP-net is reduced .
By iterating the above construction every CP-net
can be transformed to a reduced CP-net. As an ex-
ample consider a CP-net with three features, X,Y
and Z, with the respective domains {a1, a2}, {b1, b2}
and {c1, c2}. Suppose now that Pa(X) = Pa(Y ) =
∅, Pa(Z) = {X,Y } and that
≻(a1, b1) = ≻(a2, b1), ≻(a1, b2) = ≻(a2, b2),
≻(a1, b1) = ≻(a1, b2), ≻(a2, b1) = ≻(a2, b2).
Then both X and Y are redundant, so we can re-
duce the CP-net by reducing Pa(Z) to ∅. Z becomes
an independent variable in the reduced CP-net with
an ordering over its domain which coincides with the
unique one given in the original CP-net in terms of the
assignments to its parents.
In what follows for a CP-net N we denote by r(N)
the corresponding reduced CP-net. The following re-
sult summarizes the relevant properties of r(N) and
relates it to the constructions of G(N) and N (G).
Theorem 3
(i) Each CP-net N and its reduced form N ′ = r(N)
have the same ordering ≻ over the outcomes.
(ii) For each CP-net N and its reduced form N ′ =
r(N) we have G(N) = G(N ′).
(iii) Each reduced CP-net N is a reduced CP-net cor-
responding to the game G(N). Formally: N =
r(N (G(N))).
Part (i) states that the reduction procedure pre-
serves the ordering over the outcomes. Part (ii) states
that the construction of a game corresponding to a CP-
net does not depend on the redundancy of the given
CP-net. Finally, part (iii) states that the reduced CP-
net N can be obtained ‘back’ from the game G(N).
Games G such that the CP-net N ′ = r(N (G)) is
acyclic are not uncommon. In fact, they naturally
represent multi-agent scenarios where agents (that is,
players of the game) can be partitioned into levels
1, 2, . . . , n, such that agents at level i can express their
preferences (that is, payoff function) without looking
at what players at higher levels do. Informally, agents
at level i are more important than agents at level j
is j > i. In particular, agents at level 1 can decide
their preferences without looking at the behavior of
any other agent.
7 Game-theoretic techniques in CP-
nets
Given the correspondence between CP-nets and
games and its properties presented in the previous sec-
tions, we can now use them to transfer standard tech-
niques of game theory, used to find Nash equilibria, to
CP-nets to find their optimal outcomes.
More specifically, we can transfer two techniques of
iterated elimination of ‘suboptimal’ strategies —those
that are strictly dominated or are never best responses
(see, e.g., [6].) To introduce them in the context of
CP-nets consider a CP-net N with the set of variables
{X1, . . ., Xn} with the corresponding finite domains
D(X1), . . .,D(Xn).
• We say that an element di from the domainD(Xi)
of the variable Xi is a best response to a pref-
erence statement
XI = aI : ≻i
for Xi if di i d′i for all d
′
i
∈ D(Xi).
• We say that an element di from the domain of the
variable Xi is a never a best response if it is
not a best response to any preference statement
for Xi.
• Given two elements di, d′i from the domain D(Xi)
of the variable Xi we say that d
′
i is strictly
dominated by di if for all preference statements
XI = aI : ≻i for Xi we have
di ≻i d
′
i.
By a subnet of a CP-net N we mean a CP-net ob-
tained from N by removing some elements from some
variable domains followed by the removal of all pref-
erence statements that refer to a removed element.
Then we introduce the following relation between a
CP-net N and its subnet N ′:
N →NBRN
′
when N 6= N ′ and for each variable Xi each removed
element from the domain ofXi is never a best response
in N , and introduce an analogous relation N →S N ′
for the case of strictly dominated elements.
The following result then holds.
Theorem 4 Suppose that N → ∗
NBR
N ′, i.e., the CP-
net N ′ is obtained by an iterated elimination of never
best responses from the CP-net N .
(i) Then s is an optimal outcome of N iff it is an
optimal outcome of N ′.
(ii) If each variable in N ′ has a singleton domain,
then the resulting outcome is a unique optimal
outcome of N .
(iii) All iterated eliminations of never best responses
from the CP-net N yield the same final outcome.
To illustrate the use of this theorem reconsider the
first CP-net from Section 2, i.e., the one with the pref-
erence statements
d : a ≻ a, d : a ≻ a,
a : b ≻ b, a : b ≻ b,
b : c ≻ c, b : c ≻ c,
c : d ≻ d, c : d ≻ d.
Denote it by N .
We can reason about it using the iterated elimina-
tion of strictly dominated strategies (which coincides
here with the iterated elimination of never best re-
sponses, since each domain has exactly two elements).
We have the following chain of reductions:
N →SN1 →SN2 →SN3 →SN4,
where
• N1 results from N by removing a (from the do-
main of A) and the preference statements d : a ≻
a, d : a ≻ a, a : b ≻ b,
• N2 results from N1 by removing b and the prefer-
ence statements a : b ≻ b, b : c ≻ c,
• N3 results from N2 by removing c and the prefer-
ence statements b : c ≻ c c : d ≻ d,
• N4 results from N3 by removing d from the do-
main of D and the preference statement c : d ≻ d.
Indeed, in each step the removed element is strictly
dominated in the considered CP-net. So using the it-
erated elimination of strictly dominated elements we
reduced the original CP-net to one in which each vari-
able has a singleton domain and consequently found a
unique optimal outcome of the original CP-net N .
Finally, the following result shows that the intro-
duced reduction relation on CP-nets is complete for
acyclic CP-nets.
Theorem 5 For each acyclic CP-net N a unique sub-
net N ′ with the singleton domains exists such that
N → ∗
NBR
N ′.
8 Conclusions and future work
In this paper we related two formalisms that are
commonly used in reasoning about multi-agent sys-
tems, strategic games and CP-nets. To this end we
generalized the concept of strategic games to games
with parametrized preferences and showed that opti-
mal outcomes in CP-nets are exactly Nash equilibria of
such games. This allowed us to exploit game-theoretic
techniques in search for optimal outcomes of CP-nets.
Our current research deals two other aspects con-
cerning strategic games and preferences. First, thanks
to the established correspondence, we can also use the
techniques developed to reason about optimal out-
comes of a CP-net in search for Nash equilibria of
strategic games with parametrized preferences. These
techniques, as recently shown in [4, 7], involve the use
of the customary constraint solving techniques. In
fact, it has been shown that the optimal outcomes of
any CP-net, even a cyclic one, can be found by just
solving a set of hard constraints. Thus hard constraint
solving is enough to find also Nash equilibria in strate-
gic games.
Second, we found that the direct correpondence be-
tween the optimal solutions of a CP-net and the Nash
equilibria of the corresponding game cannot be easily
found in other preference modelling formalisms, for ex-
ample soft constraints, see [1]. In fact, it is possible
to show that, in a so-called fuzzy constraint problem,
there can be optimal solutions which are not Nash
equilibria of corresponding games, and vice-versa. We
are therefore studying the conditions under which soft
constraints can be related to game theory.
In this paper we assumed that payoff functions give
a linear order over the strategies of a player. It could
be useful to see whether our results can be generalized
to games in which players’ strategies can be incompa-
rable or indifferent to each other, thus using partial
orderings with ties. We are currently studying this
scenario.
This paper is just a first step towards what we
think is a fruitful cross-fertilization between prefer-
ences, constraint solving, and game theory.
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